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Summary findings
Honohan  and Lane analyze the prospects for greater  prudential regulation of financial systems could be
monetary integration in Africa in the wake of the  achieved through international cooperation without the
European Monetary Union.  need for a common currency. The same is true of
They argue that the structural characteristics of African  enhanced risk-pooling through the financial system.
economies are quite different from those of European  The European Monetary Union has only a marginal
economies, but that much can be gained from monetary  impact on the net benefits of monetary cooperation, but
cooperation - as an external agency of restraint and for  the euro would be a natural anchor for any African
promoting stability in the financial sector.  monetary union - especially if the United Kingdom and
But one should not expect too much from such  the sterling were to join the European Monetary Union.
arrangements. There is little evidence of contagious  Indeed, the most likely route to new monetary
attacks on African currencies requiring the coordination  cooperation in Africa is through a common peg to the
of exchange rate policies. And economies of scale in the  euro.
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Introduction
The  arrival  of  EMU  has  sparked  a  new  wave  of  interest  in  cooperative  monetary
arrangements in  Africa.  More than a  generation after the demise of  the east African
shilling, there is talk of a new common currency for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.  And
in the CFA zone, widely believed to be on its last legs in 1992-93, the recent trend has
been for wider membership (Guinea-Bissau joined in 1997) - now with the peg linked to
the euro.
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether the new enthusiasm has a rational basis,
and what the policy implications may be.  There are three parts.  The first part reviews
historical aspects of African experience with monetary cooperation, with a special focus
on the crisis of the CFA franc zone.  At best, the historical record here has been one of
mixed  success and future monetary cooperation in Africa should build  on the lessons
provided by the successes and failures of the past.
In the second part, we analyse four major policy dimensions of the currency union debate
against an African background.  We look at currency unions as an agency of restraint on
government,  as  a  means  of  deepening the  financial  system,  as  a  means  of  limiting
problems of speculative pressure, and finally at the pattern of international integration,
which is at the heart of the traditional optimal currency area literature (though we focus
more  on this  as  a  basis  for  selecting  an  anchor than  as  a  framework  for  assessing
optimality of currency union).  In each case we highlight issues that are vitally important
in the African context but  were less relevant during the EMU debate.  We discuss the
impact of EMU on the calculus facing African countries in deciding to  pursue greater
monetary cooperation and marshal the relevant empirical evidence.
The  main  results  of  our  analysis  can  be  summarised  as  follows.  EMU  provides  a
demonstration effect suggesting to African countries that regional monetary integration
need not have post-colonial connotations.  But its use as an external agency of restraint
remains the strongest attraction of a multi-country currency arrangement.  The euro is a
more attractive external  anchor than  any single national European  currency,  and  will
become much more so if and when it subsumes sterling.  Achievement of economies of
scale  in  the  financial  sector  is  an  important  additional  goal,  but  one  which  can  be
furthered by regional cooperation and integration even if there is not a common currency.
The advantages of monetary integration for promoting trade and limiting  contagion of
1speculative flows remain more limited in the African context - the latter not least because
African currencies remain "below the radar screen" for international speculators.
I:  African Experience with Monetary Cooperation
LI  The chequered history of economic regionalism in Africa
Traceable back at least to the Berlin Conference's 1885 decree that navigation should be
free on the Niger and Congo rivers, regional economic cooperation for the facilitation of
international trade and payments has long been high on the African policy agenda.  There
have  been noteworthy  cooperative initiatives  in  both  public  infrastructure,  including
ports, railways and other forms of transport and logistical infrastructure, all-important for
the international access of land-locked countries.  But there have been centrifugal forces
too, some of them economic, related to the difficulty in sharing the costs and benefits of
economic integration.  This was the underlying reason for the reluctance of Cote d'Ivoire
to see a continued federation of francophone countries in West Africa post independence,
and also contributed to the 1977 collapse of the East African Community (Oliver and
Atmore, 1994, Foroutan, 1993, Radelet, 1997).
In  practice,  despite  the  formation  of  multiple  regional  trade  arrangements  with  an
overlapping - and variable - membership, regional trade integration in Africa has been
remarkably undeveloped.  Yeats (1999) shows that, while the share of African countries'
exports that stays within Africa has grown from about 8 per cent in 1989 to 12 per cent in
1995, this growth has not come from an expansion of trade within the various regional
preferential trading areas, and there has been very little manufacturing or intra-industry
trade (with fully one-half of this trade accounted for by petroleum, cotton, live animals,
maize and cocoa).  Actually, given the modest market size, the 12 per cent share should
not be a surprise, as is confinned by the use of gravity models (Foroutan, 1993).  In fact,
the products that African countries export do not correspond to what African countries
import: revealed comparative advantage does not therefore suggest a strong unexploited
potential for intra-African trade (Yeats, 1999).'
Widening  the  perspective  to  global  exports  of  African  countries,  we  still  find  a
remarkable concentration  in a  handful of primary products  (petroleum, fish,  tobacco,
coffee, cotton and cocoa each account for over 40 per cent of some country's exports).
Inasmuch as there is some regional clustering of these export products, they can be the
source of common regional shocks, whether from the terms of trade or from region-wide
weather-related and other supply shocks.
That said, Yeats notes that the volume of inter-African  is likely  understated  in the data. Distorted  real
exchange  rates may have skewed  the pattern of trade among  sets of countries  during particular  intervals.
However,  extensive  use of vehicle  currencies  has limited  the impact  of nominal  exchange  rate variability
on trade.
2Often  driven by neo-protectionist  motivations seeking to  promote  import  substitution
behind regional barriers, efforts to promote regional trade integration in Africa have often
been too partial to have yielded  overall benefits.  Moreover, regional trade  agreements
often  did  not  in  practice  function  as  intended  and  announced,  detracting  from  their
credibility (Mansoor and Inotai,  1992, Radelet,  1997).  More limited coordination and
cooperation arrangements have been more successful.
But what of monetary integration?  In principle it is less likely to have a net protectionist
effect  by  diverting  trade  and  investment.  Furthermore,  credibility  would  be  a  key
instrument, rather than being incidental.
L2  Monetary cooperation experiences
Origins
In the colonial and post-colonial era, monetary cooperation between  different countries
has been more widespread in Africa than in any  other part of  the Developing  World.
Various groupings of French and British colonies cooperated on half a dozen common
monetary arrangements which, as the colonial era drew to a close, covered two in every
three of what are now independent states in sub-Saharan Africa.  It is worth noting that
these arrangements were originally driven by administrative convenience and seigniorage
considerations: issues of exchange rate policy and fiscal restraint did not at first arise. 2
Two  main  approaches  were  adopted.  The  British  colonies  had  a  currency  board
arrangement, with the colonial currency pegged to, and (more or less) fully backed, by the
pound sterling, but with seigniorage revenues accruing to the colonial administration by
virtue  of  the  interest  eamed  on  investment  of  the  reserves  in  British  Government
Securities.  (Appendix Table 1 provides a list of the members of the old British currency
boards in Africa).  The limited local role in these boards should be borne in mind: for
example, two of the three boards had their headquarters in London. 3
2 Curiously,  although  the Banco Nacional Ultramarino  was the designated  bank of issue in most of the
Portuguese  colonies, in Angola it was superseded  in this role by a newly established  Banco de Angola in
1926.  Thus the two  largest Portuguese colonies in  Africa did not have  a  cooperative monetary
arrangement,  even  though each had a colonial  currency  circulating  at a fixed  parity  with the escudo;  these
arrangements  were promptly abandoned  following  the collapse of Portuguese  rule in 1975.  While the
successor currencies  were, for many years, ostensibly  stronger than the escudo, this was at the cost of
severe  price and exchange  controls  and  rationing. Currency  for the Belgian  colonies  was issued  at par with
the Belgian  franc from 1909  by the private  Banque  du Congo Belge, and from about 1950 by the Central
Bank of the Belgian  Congo and Ruanda-Urundi..
3  There has been a recent tendency to exaggerate the degree to which currency boards functioned
mechanically  and smoothly.  Each had a certain  amount  of policy  discretion,  and  the East African  Currency
Board went through a severe crisis in the 1930s  with its sterling assets dipping below one-fifth  of the
currency  issue.  However,  it recovered  well and by 1963 assets  (86% in sterling)  exceeded liabilities  by
over 12  per cent (Crick, 1965).
3The French colonial franc was also pegged to the metropolitan franc, 4 but in this case the
currency  issue  was  eventually  backed  by  a  convertibility  guarantee  of  the  French
Treasury, and by restrictions on the degree of lending that might be made to Government.
The contrasts between the two systems mirrored the long-established contrasts in central
banking in  the  governing countries.  The  British currency  boards  could be  seen  as
modelled on the currency arrangements embodied in the British  1844 Bank Act: their
balance sheets and functions resembled those of the Issue Department of the Victorian
Bank of England.  In contrast to the British boards, but like the Banque de France, the
French-based banks of issue lent substantial sums to the local banking system, with the
result that their currencies were backed to a considerable extent by claims on banks.
Post-independence monetary cooperation
After independence, the French  systems survived much longer than the British.  Two
distinct franc-based monetary unions in West and Central Africa still function today, and,
despite vicissitudes, most of the original members are still participants. 5 There has been
just  one  devaluation against the  French franc (by 50 per  cent in January  1994).  As
elaborated in below, this followed a long period of economic stagnation reflecting loss of
price competitiveness, fiscal indiscipline and banking collapse; subsequent growth has
been quite strong.
Central  Banking,  with  its  implication  of  policy  activism,  and  potential  and  actual
exchange rate variability,  came to the British colonies in  South Central  Africa before
independence, 6 and the Central African Currency Board was wound up by 1956.  In West
Africa, ideology,  activist policy and  a sense of the national currency  as a  symbol of
sovereignty  meant that  most  participants  abandoned the  currency board  arrangement
either on independence, or shortly after it.  Sierra Leone and the Gambia continued to
operate their own currency board-type arrangements for a few more years, with Gambia
being the last African country to leave the sterling peg, in 1971.
The three core members of the East African Currency Board did retain their  common
currency until 1966 - up to five years after independence, but by this stage its political
viability  had  been  eroded  by  fiscal  activism  and  by  wider  dissatisfaction  with  the
distribution of the benefits within the East African Community.
4Though  it did not devalue  with the latter in 1948,  thereby setting one CFA franc equal to two French
francs  until  the latter  was recast  as one-hundredth  of the new French  franc  in 1959.
5 Guinea did not stay with the CFA franc on independence,  and Mali dropped out for a while.  Tiny
Equatorial Guinea  (1985)  and Guinea  Bissau (1997) have  been new  recruits.  The story  of  Maghrib
currencies, the Comoros and Madagascar would take us too far afield.
6 The ubiquitous role of a Mr. J.B. Loynes of the Bank of England in the last years of the currency boards
is interesting.  It was he who wrote the  1957 report advising the Nigerian government to set up a central
bank.  A few years later we find him as a member of the East African Currency Board advising them to
seek a revised mandate allowing such activities as discounting bills and lending for the financing of crops.
He is also the author of the West African Currency Board's official history.
4Neither  the  franc-based currency union,  with  its  French  guarantee, nor  the  currency
board, with its rigid institutional arrangements, are particularly close to the EMU system.
Indeed, the  fixed peg  which  characterized both  of  these  systems  makes  them  quite
different in practice from the floating exchange rate of the euro.  In some respects, a more
similar  arrangement  can  be  seen  in  the  South  African Rand  Zone,  where  Lesotho,
Namibia, Swaziland and, for a time, Botswana held their currencies at par with the South
African rand, allowing the latter to circulate freely alongside local currency and receiving
in return a payment in lieu of seigniorage.  Of course this is not an arrangement among
equals,  in  that  South  Africa  is  economically dominant,  and  does  not  undertake  to
moderate its monetary policy to meet the requirements of the other members.  But the
seigniorage  sharing,  and  the  flexibility  of  the  peg  vis-ta-vis the  outside  world,  are
important characteristics which it shares with the EMU.
I.3  Fiscal indiscipline and monetary regimes in Africa
For those countries that did not retain the rules-based systems bequeathed by the colonial
administration, post-independence monetary policy in Africa took sharply different routes
in  different countries (as documented in  Honohan and O'Connell,  1997).  One route,
preferred on ideological grounds by socialist-minded governments, was an economy of
rationing and  controls.  Another possibility, though not one consciously advocated by
anyone, was to give up any attempt to restrain inflation, and to allow the printing press
free rein.  The major goal of each of these regimes was to  channel resources  to  the
government,  one through financial repression (Chamley and Honohan,  1993), and the
other through the inflation quasi-tax.'  Quite often countries passed though both of these
stages, slipping from a controlled regime into open inflation.
The cost of the distortions imposed by financial repression and high  inflation became
increasingly apparent during the  1980s, and governments moved to dismantle controls
and reduced their reliance on the printing press.  Although administrative credit ceilings
were retained at first, the trend was clearly towards a more market-oriented regime of
discretionary central banking.
But regime credibility remained low.  Governments still needed to draw on the monetary
system for resources, and their heavy borrowings resulted in high nominal interest rates,
presumably reflecting fear of devaluation.  Persistent and substantial excess returns were
recorded. This was also true of the remaining rules-based systems, such as the CFA franc
zone.
7  See Beaugrand  (1997) for the extreme example of Zaire, which saw the highest inflation rates ever
recorded  in International  Financial  Statistics,  with consumer  prices increasing  one-thousand-fold  in the
twelve  months from October  1993.
5L4  The Crisis  of the CFA Zone
The collapse of the 1980s - overview
At first sight, the underlying structure established for the franc zone in West and Central
Africa appeared to  be  solid.  The underlying economic philosophy  of the  franc zone
arrangements was always that of an open and competitive market.  Although established at
independence, and not  drastically altered since then, the institutional arrangements are
strikingly modem in appearance. In particular there have been multinational central banks
(which are thus independent of any one national government), rules constraining monetary
financing of fiscal deficits, an open capital account, widespread presence of foreign-owned
banks and the lowest inflation rates in Africa.  From some points of view the regime has
looked like a precursor to EMU with its single currency, its freedom of capital movements
and its multinational central bank.  But any attempt to draw conclusions for the prospects of
wider African monetary unions must pause to consider the 1  980s crisis of the CFA zone.
Until the  mid-1980s,  economic performance of the  franc zone countries  appeared  to
justify  the high  expectations which had been placed  in the arrangements.  The fixed
exchange rate with France appeared to remove macroeconomic uncertainty and encourage
external investment.  Growth rates were high, even when comparison is made conditional
on other country characteristics that are positively associated with growth performance.
Not only were  CFA franc notes used in preference to unstable and inconvertible local
currencies in neighbouring countries such as Ghana and Nigeria, but some parts, at least,
of the  franc zone banking system  were functioning  so smoothly that  it  too  received
substantial deposits of flight capital from those countries.
In the end, the inflexibility and brittle character of the system's institutional mechanisms
proved to be its downfall, bringing the functioning of the banking system almost to a halt
in  several of the countries from the mid-1980s.  By the end of 1993 almost all of the
countries in the zone were in deep recession.  A parallel market in the CFA  franc had
opened up,  and  not only  were capital movements now blocked, but  effecting current
international payments had become difficult.  A majority of the banks had failed, though
some had been recapitalized or rescued in one form or another.  Depositors in some banks
had gone without access to their funds for years.  The banks that continued to function
now tended to be highly selective in their clientele, both on the deposit and the lending
side.  Interbank markets were operating on a very limited basis.  Having lost heavily from
the collapse of debtor banks, the central banks were close to being unable to cover their
operating expenses.
Given prolonged and ultimately accurate speculation on the part of market  participants
that a major devaluation was in the offing, it is easy to  see why the banking systems
should have ended up in an illiquid position.  But there was more to  it than that.  For
years the governments  in several member  states had  directly or indirectly pushed the
banks into lending to state-owned enterprises, or to regional and political groupings, or
simply to  some of the governments' own suppliers who had not been paid.  Over the
6years, the share of borrowers who could not or would not  repay, including those  who
interpreted  a  politically-driven  loan  as  equivalent  to  a  grant,  grew.  Widespread
insolvency in several of the banking systems became apparent from the mid-1980s.
Role of bank behavior
But why did these banks, operating after all in a market environment, agree to make these
loans?  How did they attract resources to make such onlending?  Most were joint ventures
between the national governments and one of four major French-based banks; sometimes
the government was the majority shareholder, sometimes not.  In either case, the key senior
management was provided by French nationals seconded from the parent banks in France.
But the objective of the French shareholders  is unlikely to have been profit maximization.
They had  other interests, including the commercial interests in  Africa of their  French
customers. They will not have been unconscious of the wider political agenda of the French
government, which was owner of the French banks for at least part of the period, and a
strong influence at all times.  This agenda was normally supportive of the governments in
power.  To  acquiesce in conmmercially  doubtful lending circumstances was not  such a
surprising decision for banks constituted with such a structure of ownership and control.
Although  formally  autonomous, the  reality for  these joint-venture  banks  was  deeply
entangled in political considerations.
Nor were the banks constrained by lack of loanable resources. It is not that they had ready
access to  deposit resources.  Indeed, deposit mobilization in the  CFA has  long been
exceptionally low - a fact generally attributed to the open capital market.  But they were
able to secure funds from the two regional central banks.  To be sure, these were inhibited
from much lending to governments, but they were free to refinance lending through the
banking  system,  and  in practice  it  was they who  effectively provided the  necessary
resources.
Thus, although the central banks were apparently freed by statute from any fiscal pressure,
they nevertheless succumbed to indirect pressure to lend through banks for relief of fiscal
needs.  Systematically  it proved to be the insolvent banks that had relied most on the central
banks for refinancing. Even the central banks' self interest in preserving the quality of their
own balance sheet (in  order to ensure adequate revenue to  meet their not  insubstantial
operational expenses) was not sufficient to limit their lending to doubtful banks.  For (at
least in the Western part of the zone) the statutory arrangements  were understood to provide
the central bank with a govemment guarantee of lending to banks.  In this way was the
circle completed and the apparently cautious rules built into the system subverted.  The
central banks, nominally independent, acted as if they were agents of the fiscal authorities,
refinancing politically directed or government-inspired bank lending that could never be
repaid.
7A Rules-based  System  that  Did  Not Guarantee  Sound  Policy
It seems clear that the rigidity of the framework established for monetary and banking
arrangements in the franc zone lulled policy-makers into a false sense of security.  These
rules did not  guarantee the correct incentives, and indeed the very rigidity of the rules
induced  an  evolution  of  banking practice which  violated our  incentive principles  by
subordinating both  commercial and central banking to fiscal pressures.  Three rules  in
particular were relied upon as nostrums which would guarantee a favorable outcome and
were thus seen as inoculating the system against the consequences of mistaken policy in
other spheres.
First, the exchange rate rule, which was seen as the key to macroeconomic stability: but it
could not cope with the procyclical public sector wage policy and the optimistic policy of
ratcheting official purchasing prices for the all-important cash crops (especially coffee and
cocoa) to the highest figures attained to date.  Accordingly, formal sector labor became
uncompetitive, leading to recession, and the crop credits provided by the banks for the
purchasing of crops at what had become unrealistic prices could not be repaid.  The inability
of the banking system to find a satisfactory way of funding merchants' working capital - the
quintessential and original banking product - was symptomatic of the depth of the system's
failure.
Second, the rule that the banking sector could not lend the government more than a fraction
of its annual revenue needs.  This was seen as insulating the system from inflationary credit
expansion, but  it merely diverted the pressures into indirect borrowing through public
enterprises and other associated bodies and through government payments arrears (which
forced their  suppliers to  seek bank  credit in  anticipation of eventual payment).  The
consequence was an increasing degree of illiquidity in the system as payments discipline
collapsed.
Third, the rule that each national government was responsible for the debts to the central
bank of any insolvent bank.  This reflected the partial delegation of bank regulation to
national authorities but,  while encouraging insouciant lending by  the  central bank  to
unsound banks, it failed to induce national responsibility in this field.  The consequence
here was massive bank  insolvency - amounting to  at least  10% of  zone-wide GDP.
External shocks and the  recession only exacerbated the  poor  lending decisions, often
politically motivated, that led to insolvency.
It is impossible not to blame the failures on Government meddling.  Furthermore, other
developing country banking systems have also suffered from each of the symptoms of the
franc zone's banking collapse. 8 But the shocking feature of the  zone is that, before the
event, its design seemed to be rather fool-proof and its functioning was held in high esteem
'Ironically, the local branches of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) were among the few
banks in the zone whose liquidity seemed assured in the zone.
8for a couple of decades.  Only later did it become apparent that the brittle institutional
structure and mechanistic rules, perhaps appropriate  to a colonial regime, had been imported
in an environment where they could not survive the political pressures and the volatility of
the  external  environment.  This  underlines  the  need  to  ensure  the  consistency  of
macroeconomic and financial fundamentals with a fixed exchange rate system, regardless of
the other institutional rules that are devised.  Mechanistic application of automatic rules is
no guarantee of a functioning banking system.
This sorry story of implosion of the CFA zone financial system, culminating in the major
devaluation of January 1994, serves as a cautionary tale for fans of monetary unions and
indeed of rules-based monetary systems in general.  The limitations of such rules must be
recognized whether they be  the specific rules adopted in the CFA zone, or those  of a
currency board.  Although the franc-zone rules were designed to protect against monetary
instability, they were not sufficiently robust to deal with fiscal indiscipline on the scale
that  occurred.  Indeed,  the  exchange  rate  peg  ultimately  acted  to  magnify  the  real
economic  effects of  imprudent  fiscal  and  financial policy.  Clearly,  the  institutional
arrangements governing the regional central banks were not adequate to ensure for these a
successful role as quasi-external "agencies of restraint"  (Collier,  1991) on the national
governments.
1.5  The recovery of the CFA zone
Arguably, the new light thrown by EMU (then in preparation) on currency cooperation
and monetary unions was a significant factor in encouraging the CFA zone countries to
stay with their arrangements at the time of the 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc, rather
than going their separate ways reflecting the institutional and policy failures that had led
to the old peg becoming unsustainable.
And that decision has been followed by several years of recovery and comparatively rapid
economic  growth, 9 combined  with  lower-than-expected  pass-through  of  imported
inflation into domestic CPIs in the franc zone countries.
As a result of the banking crisis in the CFA franc zone, new institutional  arrangements
were  adopted  following  the  Yammossoukro  conference  of  1990,  including  the
centralization  of  responsibility  for  bank  supervision  in  two  regional  banking  control
commissions.  This centralization provides a new multinational "agency of restraint" and
fills a gap in the previous institutional arrangements.  It is noteworthy, however, that the
model  adopted here diverges from that  followed by the EMU, which  to date  has left
supervision of financial intermediaries as a national responsibility.  In this  respect, the
9  GDP growth averaging  between  5 and 6 per cent annually  1995-98  in the UEMOA  and between  4 and 5
per cent in the CEMAC  - higher or equal  to that achieved  in the remainder  of sub-Saharan  Africa,  instead
of trailing the latter as the CFA zone had for several  years before  the devaluation. Inflation in 1994  was
about 40 per cent, followed  by an average  of 5 per cent per annum  in the following  years.
9CFA  arrangements  make wider  use  of  monetary  cooperation  in  establishing  external
discipline on national fiscal and financial policy than does the EMU.
With  the  macroeconomic  recovery,  and  some  reason  for  new  confidence  in  the
institutional arrangements, it is not evident that the CFA zone faces any significant new
challenges as a result of the EMU.'°  Indeed, that the euro is now the peg rather than just
the  French  franc  should  ensure  greater  nominal  and  real  exchange  rate  stability  on
average vis-a'-vis trading partners.
The main questions thus relate to the remaining African countries.  Does EMU, together
with the new focus on the use of a common currency as an insulator against contagious or
correlated capital movements, and on the use of regional financial authorities as a quasi-
external  discipline  on national  financial policy,  point  to  any  increased  likelihood  of
additional cooperative arrangements?
II:  African Monetary Unions: Does EMU change the calculation?
Will  EMU be  an  inspiration  for the formation  of monetary  unions  among  groups  of
African countries? Does the existence EMU shift the balance in favor of one  or more
AMUs?  In this revived debate, the usefulness of AMUs is usually assessed in one or
more of the following four dimensions: as an agency of restraint on governments; as a
bulwark against contagious speculation; as a way of achieving economies of scale in the
financial sector, and finally in a traditional role as an OCA involving arguments related to
the pattern of trade and to the degree of factor mobility.
The major observation that must be made here is that Africa is not Europe: the economic
and political structures of the two continents are very different.  Thus the question  of
whether there should be AMUs is a very different one to the EMU debate.  In this section,
we identify some of the key empirical contrasts differences between Africa and Europe
relevant to each of these four key dimensions of the policy debate.
ILI  Monetary  union as an external agency of restraint
Political considerations
The record of macroeconomic mismanagement in  many African countries means  that
there  is  a  strong  case  for  delegation  of  monetary  policy,  if  a  suitable  supranational
monetary authority exists."'  Put differently, since policymaking resources are scarce in
Africa, it may make sense to "outsource" monetary policy as one possible resolution to
'  The budgetary  arrangements  with  France  have  not been  affected  by the advent  of EMU.
See Collier  and Gunning  (1999)  for a recent  survey of African  economic  performance.
10the  search  for  "agencies  of  restraint"  (Collier,  1991).12  However,  a  supranational
monetary authority may require some degree of political integration, if it is to be accepted
as democratically accountable." 3
Political  integration may be  desirable also to  minimize the "hold  up" problem  in  the
setting of monetary policy. As formalized by Dixit (1999), a common monetary policy
that is the outcome of bargaining among member countries will be skewed towards that
required by the country with the weakest fundamentals, if all participation constraints are
to  be  satisfied.  A  plausible  conjecture  is  that  this  commitment  problem  can  be
ameliorated by  political  integration, since national interests will  subside  relative to  a
pan-AMU welfare criterion.
In the absence of sufficient political integration, such a supranational monetary authority
(plus the attendant financial regulatory structure) must be very carefully designed.  This
point is well illustrated by the banking crisis of the 1980s in the CFA zone (discussed
above), inasmuch as the design of the CFA system itself generated the perverse incentives
for national government to encourage excessive lending by commercial banks.
There  has  been  no  strong  impetus  for  African  political  integration.  As  is  widely
recognized, the primary driving force behind EMU has been the politics  of European
integration. Eichengreen (1999) and Buiter (1999) point to the risks of monetary union in
the absence of some degree of political union.
There is a significant risk for any attempt to use monetary union to spearhead regional
economic cooperation within parts of Africa where economic cooperation has so far been
limited.  The speedy  collapse  of the post-colonial  currency boards  suggests that  the
survival of the Franc zone may ultimately have been based on the continuing flow  of
financial assistance to members from France that was perceived as being linked with the
currency union (though use of the automatic overdraft facility was much smaller than the
cumulative flow of other aid from France over the years).  Nevertheless, were the UK to
join EMU, thereby increasing the attraction of an euro-peg for non-Franc zone countries,
it is hard to  avoid contemplating the prospect of monetary considerations promoting  at
last a greater degree of cooperation across the old colonial boundaries as represented by
the  anglophone/francophone  divide,  especially  in  West  Africa.  This  political  and
administrative process would likely be a more potent force for economic integration than
the direct effect of achieving exchange rate stability across African borders.
Certainly no union will be a success if certain underlying pre-requisites are absent: not
only  fiscal  discipline  (here the demonstration  effect of  the high  profile  given  to  the
Maastricht criteria could be useful), but more generally well-designed and robust political
12 The potential for regional integration to generate political externalities is explored by Schiff and Winters
(1998).
3 See Stasavage (1998) on the political economy of the CFA zone.
11and economic institutions - something that could be assumed at the international level for
the European union in a way that will take time to build for would-be AMUs.
Seigniorage
Loss of seigniorage is a major fiscal consequence of monetary discipline.  A monetary
union targeting low inflation will generate only a limited amount of seigniorage.  To date,
Africa  relies  more  on  seigniorage  than Europe.  The  generation  and  distribution  of
seigniorage is a classic analytical question in the currency union literature and may have
more relevance for Africa than in the EMU debate.
The heavy reliance by African countries on seigniorage in recent years is illustrated by
the mean flow seigniorage at 1.8 per cent of GDP per annum 1980-97, falling only to 1.6
per  cent  in  1990-97.  Even  exclusion  of  the  hyperinflation  countries  Zaire  (now
Democratic Republic of Congo) and Mozambique still leaves mean flow seigniorage at
1.4 per  cent per  annum.  The year-to-year fluctuations in seigniorage  have  also  been
substantial, with the mean across countries of year-to-year standard devations at over 2
per cent of GDP  (Table 1)
Table 1: Africa: Approximate Seigniorage as % GDP since 1980
per cent of GDP per annum  1980-97  1990-97
39 sub-Saharan countries:
Overall mean (unweighted)  1.79  1.60
Standard deviation of country means  2.11  2.15
Mean of year-to-year standard deviations  2.91  2.20
excluding Zaire and Mozambique:
Overall mean (unweighted)  1.37  1.24
Standard deviation of country means  1.09  1.19
Mean of year-to-year standard deviations  2.04  2.01
Note:  This  uses the simplest  measure,  namely year-end  to year-end  change in reserve  money as share of
annual GDP.  While this is a reasonable  approximation  for most countries, it tends to overstate true
seigniorage  by the degree to which bank reserves are remunerated,  and because the flow of nominal
seignorage  typically  increases  through  the year.
Source: Calculated  from  International Financial Statistics.
The experience of the EMU shows how quickly the Mediterranean EU countries adjusted
their  policies  to  absorb  the  loss  of  seigniorage  resulting  from  adherence  to  a  hard
currency policy." 4 This example reinforces many other reasons which make it doubtful
whether  higher  past  seigniorage  should  be  seen  as  an  important  argument  against
achievement of currency stability.
14  Admittedly,  this adherence  by EU countries  resulted  in a considerable  lowering  of funding costs which,
in some cases, may have more than fully offset the loss of seigniorage. Such gains would not be as
substantial  for African  countries  with  their relatively  smaller  internal  debt.
12Potentially as relevant as the overall size of seigniorage and other benefits is the question
of their distribution.  This was the Achilles heal of the East African Community, and also
caused problems in the Franc zone (Honohan, 1991).  To survive, any new arrangements
will need to  anticipate and  make adequate provision  for the equitable  sharing  of  net
benefits."5
I. 2  Underdeveloped  banking andfinancial sectors
Twenty eight of the world's smallest 50 financial systems are in Africa.  This fragmented
financial  system entails  substantial inefficiencies and has a  limited ability  to  act as  a
shock absorber.  The economies of scale that are unexploited because of the small size of
African  financial  systems  range from  those  that  arise  at the  level  of  the  individual
financial  intermediary, to those  entailed in the production and  use of currency,  in the
administrative costs of bank supervision and in operating organized securities exchanges.
The small size of African financial markets is strikingly illustrated by the fact that the
four smallest African stock markets have a collective total of fewer than 60 companies
listed.
In particular, increasing recognition of the high administrative cost of bank  supervision
points  to  the  attractiveness  of  international  cooperative  arrangements  for  prudential
regulation of banks and other financial intermediaries and institutions.  This  could be
encouraged, but is not necessarily entailed, by formation of a currency union.  Here the
EMU does not provide a template, bank supervision remaining for the present a national
responsibility.  Indeed, it might be argued that cooperation in bank supervision might be
more effectively sought as a specific goal independent of the wider issue of monetary
union.  After  all,  as  mentioned  above,  prior  examples  of  successful  international
cooperation in Africa indicate that limited and focused initiatives have more likelihood of
success than more far-reaching attempts at integration.  Even establishment of a cross-
country authority  for prudential regulation of banks may seem somewhat ambitious  in
this context,  but  it has  been achieved by the CFA  countries, and - by  distancing  the
supervisors from the improper pressures so often brought to bear by politicians and other
influential  persons,  especially  in  small  economies  - it  could  help  enhance  the
effectiveness of bank supervision (Caprio and Honohan, 1999).
Regionalization of banking  could also offer  some potential for risk-reduction  through
better international diversification of loan portfolios.  National  frontiers, often seen  as
important barriers to the information flows that are key to effective bank lending, may be
less so in the many parts of Africa where national frontiers bear little relation to ethnic
and language groups.  Internationalization of the banking sector can also contribute to the
minimization of vulnerability to financial crisis.  A foreign-owned bank  can rely on its
home country supervisor to  act as lead regulator and  its monetary  authority  to  act as
5 The Franc and Rand zones  both include  a seigniorage  sharing  mechanism.
13lender of last resort. Multi-country  banks are more diversified  and hence less vulnerable
to a downturn  in any one country. Moreover,  foreign  banks can improve  expertise in the
domestic  banking sector, for instance  through  the introduction  of more sophisticated  risk
control  techniques. A common  currency  might facilitate  the development  of cross-border
banking,  though it may not be necessary  and the experience  of the CFA zone shows that
it is certainly  not a sufficient  condition (Honohan, 1991),  as does the early experience
with EMU.
11.3  Monetary Union  as a Bulwark against  Speculative Contagion
African countries typically do not possess deep or liquid domestic financial markets 16.
Most  asset trade  (e.g.  issue  of  government debt) is  denominated in  international
currencies.  On the one side (continuing  the theme of the previous subsection), this
increases  the incentive  for monetary  integration,  in order  to achieve  the scale required for
effective functioning of liquid financial markets.' 7 On the other side, the  lack of a
tradable currency or assets means that, unlike EMS currencies in  1992-93, African
countries are currently "below the radar screen" of international  speculators, reducing
exposure  to contagion  problems.
As noted by Calvo (1999a), the optimal currency area literature has signally ignored
financial  factors." 8 If Africa is regarded  as a cluster  on world financial  markets,  it follows
that there is a strong interdependence  between their individual monetary and exchange
rate policies. For instance,  a devaluation  by one country  may spark speculative  attacks on
other members  of the same financial  cluster. In the presence  of such an externality,  it is
inefficient  to set non-cooperative  policies.' 9
Why might African countries be clustered together by intemational investors?  The
patterns of  contagion that  have  been  identified in  recent  years  admit  multiple
interpretations but Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) find that a  financial chain is the
dominant mechanism. A financial  cluster is seen as operating  along the following  lines:
First, if countries  share  a common  creditor,  a non-performing  loan in country  A hurts the
balance sheet of the creditor, who in turn may call in or refuse to rollover a loan to
country B.  (This effect is strongest  if the creditor  has a weak initial position, so that it
cannot absorb bad loans).  Second, countries  may be linked by cross-market hedging:
based on historical  correlations,  if A falls, the trading program  instructs the trader to exit
16An important  exception  is South  Africa.
17 This raises the question  of the optimal  currency  denomination  of public debt in a currency  union. In the
EMU debate,  a major concern was that undisciplined  fiscal policies by individual  member states might
threaten overall monetary  policy. One option is to require government  debt to be issued in external
currency, in order to reduce the incentive  to inflate away the debt. The downside,  of course, is that the
existence of external liabilities can constrain the use of monetary policy in adjusting to shocks, since
devaluation  would  raise  the domestic  burden  of external  debt.
" He notes that the word finance  is absent  from the index of De Grauwe's  popular  textbook  on EMU.
19 In the context of the Asian crisis, Rose (1998) recommends  the creation of regional monetary  funds in
response  to this interdependency  problem.
14B. Third, redemption/margin  calls  may force  an investor  to sell B in the wake of a decline
in A in order  to restore  liquidity. Fourth,  herding  may occur:  if A and B are superficially
similar (e.g. neighbouring  countries),  uninformed  investors  will exit B if A declines.
Is the financial  cluster  story relevant  to Africa? If Africa  is too small to warrant inclusion
in  international portfolios, it  may be  shielded from the fickleness of  international
investors  by default. (Of course,  this comes at a heavy price in terms of lack of access  to
private capital flows, inhibiting  the pace of development  and reducing the ability of
Africans to  lay off part of domestic production risk.)  Besides, lack of  developed
domestic  financial  markets reduces  liquidity  and limits the scale and speed with which a
capital outflow can be engineered by speculators.  Paradoxically, in  some respects
creation  of AMUs  could actually  increase  the exposure  of the member  states. After  all, by
making the investment unit larger, formation of  an AMU it may make viable the
formation  of liquid and deep domestic  financial  markets. But the improved  liquidity  and
increased  scale may in turn attract  international  investment  institutions,  making the union
radar-visible and thereby increasing vulnerability to  an external run  (Goldfajn and
Valdes, 1997).  In this scenario,  while no individual  member would be vulnerable to
speculation  differentially  targeted  at it, the union as a whole  might be.
A further point limiting the likely extent of contagion is that, to the extent that Africa
does have private external  liabilities,  these are largely owed to colonial  powers and such
creditors  might be expected  to be better-informed  investors.
But to the extent that the contagion  story is nevertheless  relevant, it is worth examining
whether African countries  cluster in regard to their sources of external bank finance, in
that such clusters could conceivably  be seen as the basis for a common  currency  policy.
In  fact, there  are  such clusters.  Indeed, African dependence on  bank finance is
concentrated  to a large extent on a small handful of countries. The largest single source
accounts on average for over 60 per cent of total identified industrial country bank
financing of sub-Saharan African countries.  Here the old colonial connections have
persisted  to a greater  extent  than in trade. In more than one-half  the countries,  the former
colonial power is still the largest source of bank financing.  Table 2 shows how French
banks are still the major source  of financing  for most of the former  French colonies. The
British connection also holds up in much of eastern and south-central  Africa, though
German banks dominate in several of the larger countries.  Other largest sources for
particular  countries  are Belgium,  Austria,  Canada,  Italy, Spain  and the United States. The
average  share  coming from EU countries  (other  than Portugal)  is 81 per cent, and only six
of fifty African countries shown have less than two-thirds  of their bank credit coming
from the EU.
15Table 2: The pattern ofAfrican  dependence on industrial country banking systems.
Bank (a)  Colony  (b)  Bank (a)  Colony  (b)
Algeria  F  F  Eritrea  I  I
Benin  F  F  Namibia  D  D
Burkina  Faso  F  F  Djibouti  F  UK
Cameroon  F  F  Kenya  F  UK
Central  African  F  F  Lesotho  F  UK
Republic  Mauritius  F  UK
Chad  F  F  Seychelles  F  UK
Comoros  F  F  Burundi  F  BE
Congo  F  F  Rwanda  F  BE
Gabon  F  F  Zaire  F  BE
Guinea  F  F  Angola  F  PT
Ivory Coast  F  F  Somalia  F  I
Madagascar  F  F  Nigeria  D  UK
Mali  F  F  South  Africa  D  UK
Mauritania  F  F  Zambia  D  UK
Morocco  F  F  Guinea  Bissau  D  PT
Niger  F  F  Mozambique  D  PT
Senegal  F  F  Sao Tome  & Principe  D  PT
Togo  F  F  Ethiopia  D  I
Tunisia  F  F  Gambia  AT  UK
Botswana  UK  UK  Malawi  AT  UK
Ghana  UK  UK  Swaziland  CAN  UK
Tanzania  UK  UK  Sierra  Leone  BE  UK
Uganda  UK  UK  Cape Verde  E  PT
Zimbabwe  UK  UK  Equatorial  Guinea  USA  E
(a) Largest  source  of bank  finance.
(b) Former  colonial  power
Note: The left  hand  column  shows  the industrial  country  from  which  each  African  country  receives  most
bank  credit;  the  right  hand  column  identifies  the  principal  former  colonial  power.
Source:  BIS-IMF-World  Bank  data.
To the extent that these banking links  argue for a common currency policy to protect
against contagion based on common source countries, there are clear implications for the
use of a euro peg, depending again on whether the UK is a member.
On the other hand,  it needs to be noted that there is little evidence of contagion in the
currency experience of African countries.  Africa has not been hit by clusters of exchange
rate  crises,  whether  one  includes  only  successful  crises  (as  indicated  by  a  monthly
depreciations  greater  than  3  standard  deviations  from  the  mean  monthly  dollar
depreciation  against  the US  dollar)  or  by  severe  reserve  losses  (again  measured  by
3-standard deviation outliers).  Only on four occasions did more than three countries have
an exchange rate crisis, thus defined, in the same month, two of these were rand-zone
movements and a third was the CFA franc devaluation of January 1994.  The fourth case
16was in March 1991  and involved  seven  countries  with a maximum  devaluation  of 11 per
cent.  There has been even less clustering  of reserves  crises, and those that occurred  did
not coincide  with the exchange  rate crisis clusters. Thus, so far the threat of contagious
or correlated  currency  attacks  does  not seem  to have  been  present  in Africa (Table  3).
Table  3:  Clustering  of exchange  rate or reserves  crises in Africa, 1980-1998
No. of months
No. of countries  with crisis  Exchange  rate  crisis  Reserves  crisis
none  69  83
1  28  19
2  5  4
3  4  2
4  0  0
5  2  0
6  0  0
7  1  0
8 or more  1  0
Note: includes  Maghrib  countries. See text for definition  of crisis. Data source:  International  Financial
Statistics.
To be sure, formation of AMUs and the optimal exchange rate regime could have a
dynamic element. We have noted that individual African countries are financially
backward  but that each AMU may endogenously  develop deeper, more liquid financial
markets and more effective financial intermediation  through a consolidated banking
system.  The improved development of domestic financial and banking sectors should
improve the access of African to private international capital flows.  In itself, this  is
highly desirable but also makes it more likely that Africa will be more exposed to capital
market volatility  in the future.  If newly-created AMUs do actually forn  a cluster on
international financial markets, this enhanced exposure to contagion effects may in turn
prompt a new round of policy coordination among the AMUs and possible mergers to
create a smaller number of larger currency unions.
H.14  Patterns  of economic  interdependency
The traditional OCA  literature focuses on the pattern of economic interdependency of
potential union members, and emphasizes openness to mutual  trade, diversification of
individual  economies  and  mobility  of  factors,  especially  labour,  as  criteria  for
membership.  Exploration of the extent to  which members are subject to idiosyncratic
shocks is also part of this agenda.  Experience with the formation of EM1  suggests that
these considerations need not be decisive in practice, as the case for Europe as an optimal
currency area is lukewarm at best (Wyplosz, 1997).  No attempt is thus made here to
replicate for Africa the various OCA tests that have been employed in the literature for
17Europe. 20 However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  degree  and  pattern  of  economic
interdependence in Africa is dramatically different from that in Europe.  The differences
suggest in particular that any currency union that might be formed would have an external
anchor; the formation of EMU makes the euro a front-runner in the role.
Thus,  suppose that  one  or more  AMUs  are  formed. Any  such  AMU  will  still  be
economically small relative to the size of the global economy and will have a much larger
dependence on  external trade  and  capital flows than  do the  EMU  zone  or the  US.
Accordingly, unlike the EMU case, the choice of  exchange rate regime remains a crucial
policy issue for an AMU.
Lack of an internal anchor
The main nominal anchor for the EMU is the internal price level of the zone.  This makes
sense for a large and rather inertial economic area.  But the overall African economy is
not large enough to represent a substantial currency bloc on its own (total GDP of sub-
Saharan Africa at market prices is comparable to that of Denmark or Pennsylvania).  Of
course that does not preclude use of the domestic price level or other internal nominal
anchors, but it does increase the likelihood that the monetary and exchange rate policy of
any African currency union would make at least some reference to an external anchor.
Furthermore, there is no obvious internal anchor-country for most potential AMUs.  The
EMS effectively evolved into a DM-zone; the ECB was modeled on the Bundesbank. The
monetary history of Africa does not provide comparable candidates, even if South Africa
plays this role in the limited context of the Rand zone.  It easy enough to point to certain
countries that naturally assume economic leadership in various regions of Africa.  South
Africa and Nigeria are obvious candidates; the former because of the size and strength of
its  economy,  the  latter  because  of  population  and  oil  wealth.  But  others  too:
Cote d'Ivoire, along with Cameroon, Senegal and Gabon among the francophones; Kenya
and Zimbabwe, along with Tanzania and Uganda among the anglophones.  These indeed
have the largest economies in Africa.  But  none combines size and a track record of
financial stability to a degree matched by Germany in the EMS.  So it is unlikely that,
aside from the Rand zone, any new currency arrangement centered on a particular African
country would emerge.
Besides, as is well-known, the pattern of African trade is largely external (Yeats, 1999),
with bilateral flows between African countries much less important compared to  intra-
European trade.  This can partly be explained by the obvious difference in the level of
development between Africa and Europe, with each individual African country producing
its own particular mix of primary commodities for export much more than engaging in
intra-industry trade.  Moreover, the geographical/natural barriers to  internal trade are
20  Migration  would be an important  element  in any such discussion. While there has been substantial
international  migration  within  Africa,  it can be argued  that much of this is either structural  in nature  (as in
the migration  from the Sahel  to coastal  cities)  or attributable  to famine  and armed  conflict.
18much higher in Africa.  Although many regional trade agreements have been negotiated
in Africa, there are no grand programs to build single markets along the lines of the
European model. 2'
The modest scale of intra-African trade, combined with the absence of a natural internal
anchor would thus appear to point to the relevance of an external anchor for any union,
but  which  external  anchor?  Trade  with  Europe  is  a  key  component  of  African
international relations.  In 28 of 45 former colonies, the former colonial power is still the
largest source country for imports.  Still, imports from former colonial powers account
for only  16 per cent of total imports.  Imports from the euro area as a whole are more
important, but still account for only 32 per cent of total imports on average (Table 4).
If one were to choose a peg on the basis of trade weights, simplistic calculations would
tend to point in the direction of the euro. 22 After all, the share of euro countries in African
imports from the industrial world exceeds one-third in each African country (with the
exception of Sao Tome-Principe).  If the UK were to join the euro, this minimum share
would jump  to  54%.  (Imports  from the  US  are much  smaller, though  this  clearly
understates the importance of the US dollar in pricing and invoicing of world trade.)
Table 4:  Share of EMU in Exports from and Imports to Africa, 1997
Imports to Africa  Exports from Africa
Average  Minimum  Maximum  Average  Minimum  Maximum
EMU as % total  35.6  4.9  71.8  38.4  3.9  88.1
EMU as %  63.1  19.9  96.6  67.0  14.0  99.3
industrial countries
EMU+UK as %  74.7  32.7  97.3  75.0  14.4  99.4
industrial countries
Note: Unweighted  country  averages.
Source:  Direction  of Trade. NB: Data for Belgium  and Luxembourg  is for 1996
Several viable options exist for the exchange rate policy of a new AMU.  One would be
to the new currency (probably not called the afro?) float - in the sense of avoiding any
explicit commitment to  an exchange rate target.  Even in this case, it is likely that the
monetary authority will in practice seek to  avoid excessive volatility against the euro,
both  in  order  to  stabilize the  domestic  price  level  and  to  minimize  disruptive real
exchange rate fluctuations.  These considerations are especially important in the early
stages of launching a new currency, in  order to establish a respectable "track record".
21  Although  bilateral intra-African  trade may be low, African countries  do export into common  "third"
markets  and so there exist indirect  trade  linkages. Following  the analysis  of Corsetti  et al (1998),  the case
for a common  monetary  policy  is strongest  if (a) goods  produced  by individual  African  countries  are close
substitutes  for each other  on third  markets;  (b) these goods  are close substitutes  for the goods produced  by
the home  producers  in third markets;  and (c) export  prices  are denominated  in domestic  currency  such that
a devaluation  raises  competitiveness.
22 Rather,  Cohen  et al (1999)  recommend  a basket  peg  (50 percent  euro, 50 percent  dollar).
19The other option is to  adopt some form of formal exchange rate peg against the euro,
ranging from a target zone to euro-isation.  There is no clear consensus on the option
value of retaining some degree of freedom to adjust the value of the exchange rate.  On
the  one  side,  some flexibility  is desirable  in the event  of a  large  terms of  trade  or
productivity shock or a local financial panic. 23 On the other, committing to  a hard peg
reduces interest rate premia and permits the reallocation of scarce domestic talent away
from management of the exchange rate regime. 24
A prudent evaluation is that no single regime cannot be recommended for all African
nations at all times, even taking into account the growing importance of financial factors
in addition to the normal OCA criteria (see also Frankel 1999).
Potential role for EMU in facilitating AMU
Here there is a potential catalytic role of the EMU itself in facilitating any AMU that
African countries might decide to establish.  Would there be benefits for the EMU, by
reducing noise  in the bilateral rates of exchange with these trading partners, or  more
generally by helping  to  stabilize their economies?  This  question is similar  to  those
discussed for the EMI  fringe currencies in Honohan and Lane (1999).  The answers there
- that there can be some benefits to the EMU in facilitating exchange rate stability in
external trading partners - also apply here, but with less force, because of the smaller size
of Africa and the absence of a dynamic towards EU membership.
If it is to avoid serious problems of moral hazard, any intervention by the EMU in the
direction of underwriting cooperative exchange rate arrangements in Africa would have
to be on a much more limited scale than has been the case for France in respect of the
CFA unions.
The Route to AMU?
A new AMU could be formed in one of three ways.  First, it is conceivable that a set of
neighbouring countries could come together and formally negotiate the establishment of a
common currency area.  Second, some countries could opt to abandon its own currency
and use the currency of a larger neighbour.  Third, countries that independently adopt a
common external anchor may opt to  pursue a joint  peg rather than seek to  maintain
individual bilateral exchange rate commitments.
With respect to the third route, with fashions in exchange rate policy moving to the poles
of free floating or currency board, it is likely that at least some African countries will opt
for some form of currency board arrangement vis-a-vis an international currency.  For
such countries, the euro will afortiori be an obvious candidate as a peg.  Combined with
the administrative and other economies of scale involved, that does suggest that joint
23 See  Eichengreen  (1998, 1999),  Chang  and Velasco  (1998, 1999)  and Velasco  (1999).
24 See  Buiter  (1999),  Calvo  (1999a,  1999b)  and  Dornbusch  (1999).
20currency board arrangements may be far preferable to a proliferation of single country
currency  boards.  The  viability  of  a  currency  board  arrangement  depends  on  the
credibility attached to adherence to currency board rules.  Here the mutuality of the joint
arrangement can be an important strength in helping to ensure the board's survival as an
agency of restraint.  Thus hitherto unlinked countries who individually desire a currency
board would  do well to  consider joining  forced with  others to  save on  costs and to
reinforce credibility. 25 Indeed, this back-door route may be the most likely scenario under
which a new AMU is formed:  via cooperation among nations that individually decide to
peg to the euro.
IV:  Concluding Remarks
The  arrival  of the  euro  does  not  radically  alter  the  prospects  for  greater  monetary
cooperation in Africa. Perhaps the most intriguing possibility is the potential, were the
UK  to join,  of the  euro being adopted as peg  by both  anglophone and  francophone
countries.  This  could open  the  door  to  new  dimensions  of international  economic
cooperation in Africa.
But one should not expect too much from such arrangements. In particular, although the
sources of bank finance to Africa are largely clustered in a handful of European countries,
there is little evidence of contagious attacks on African countries requiring coordination
of  exchange  rate  policies.  And  economies of  scale  in  the  prudential  regulation  of
financial systems could be achieved through international cooperation without the need
for a common currency.  The same is true of enhanced risk-pooling through the financial
system.
However, if  some additional African countries are to have a joint  peg,  the pattern of
current trade and financial links points to the euro now as a much more attractive peg
than any of the individual European currencies have been.  This will become more true if
sterling joins, in which case the euro would likely be a superior peg than the US dollar. In
this way, while the arrival of the euro thus widens the options for a joint peg, it need not
decisively shift the balance of advantages in favor of adoption of a  larger number of
common currency arrangements in Africa.
25  There is a certain  contemporary  resonance  in the contrast  between  the Bank of England  man Mr. J.B.
Loynes'  advocacy  of nationally  autonomous  central  banks (see  above)  and the advice  given to Tanganyika
by Dr. E. Blumental  of the Deutsche  Bundesbank  to stay with the East African  Currency  Board,  keeping
national financial  policy activism  separate  from matters  of currency  (Crick, 1965). Was it the same Dr.
Blumental  who later gave  Mr. Mobuto  some  good advice  that would  have avoided  Zaire's  hyperinflation,
but got no thanks  for it (Meditz  and Merrill,  1993)?
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24Appendix Table: Multi-country colonial currency boards of sub-Saharan Africa
Dates  of  Date  of  Years  of post-
operation  indepence  independence
operation
West African Currency Board (London)  (West  African  £=£stg)
Cameroons (part now in Nigeria)  1916-59  1959  0
Gambia  1913-71  1965  6e
Gold Coast (now Ghana)  1913-58  1957  1
Nigeria  1913-59  1960  -
Sierra Leone  1913-64  1961  3
Togoland (now part of Ghana)  1914-58  1957  1
East African Currency Board (London)  (East  African  Shilling:  20 to the £stg)
Aden a (now in Yemen)  1951-72  1967  5
British Somaliland b (now in Somalia)  1942-61  1960  1
EritreaC  1942-45  1993
EthiopiaC  1942-45
Italian Somaliland b (now in Somalia)  1941-61  1960  1
Kenya  1897-1966  1963  3
Tanganyika (now in Tanzania)  1920-66  1961  5
Uganda  1919-66  1962  4
Zanzibar (now in Tanzania)  1936-66  1961  5
Southern Rhodesian Currency Boardd Salisbury (Harare)  (Rhodesian  £=£stg)
Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia)  1940-56  1964
Nyasaland (now Malawi)  1940-56  1966
Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe)  1940-56  1965/79  -
a(Not  in Africa).  Currency  named  South  Arabian/South  Yemen  dinar  (=£1)  from 1965
bFormally  entered  system  1951. Currency  named  Somali from 1950  (1 Som  = 1  EASh).
'Wartime  user only.
dKnown as Central  African  Currency  Board  from 1953  (Federation  of Rhodesia  and Nyasaland).
eGambian £ from 1964.
Source:  Based  on Crick  (1965);  Hanke,  Jonung  and Schuler  (1993);  Sayers  (1953).
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